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The neural basis of progress monitoring has received relatively little attention compared to
other sub-processes that are involved in goal directed behavior such as motor control
and response inhibition. Studies of error-monitoring have identified the dorsal anterior
cingulate cortex (dACC) as a structure that is sensitive to conflict detection, and triggers
corrective action. However, monitoring goal progress involves monitoring correct as well
as erroneous events over a period of time. In the present research, 20 healthy participants
underwent functional magnetic resonance imagining (fMRI) while playing a game that
involved monitoring progress toward either a numerical or a visuo-spatial target. The
findings confirmed the role of the dACC in detecting situations in which the current
state may conflict with the desired state, but also revealed activations in the frontal
and parietal regions, pointing to the involvement of processes such as attention and
working memory (WM) in monitoring progress over time. In addition, activation of the
cuneus was associated with monitoring progress toward a specific target presented in
the visual modality. This is the first time that activation in this region has been linked
to higher-order processing of goal-relevant information, rather than low-level anticipation
of visual stimuli. Taken together, these findings identify the neural substrates involved
in monitoring progress over time, and how these extend beyond activations observed in
conflict and error monitoring.
Keywords: progress monitoring, conflict monitoring, error monitoring, self-regulation, dorsal anterior cingulate
cortex, cuneus
INTRODUCTION
The majority of human activity is goal-directed (Locke, 1969)
and consequently, the process by which people strive for goals
has been the focus of much social, cognitive, and neuropsy-
chological research. Berkman and Lieberman (2009) drew on
dominant frameworks for understanding goal-directed behavior
(e.g., Miller et al., 1960; Wicklund and Gollwitzer, 1981; Kuhl,
1984; Gollwitzer, 1990; Higgins et al., 1994; Carver and Scheier,
1998) to suggest that goal striving can be divided into several sub-
processes, namely goal setting, attention, motor control, response
inhibition, and progress monitoring. For example, if a person sets
himself the goal to lose weight, he may start to pay attention to
information related to losing weight (such as the caloric value of
food), increase his level of physical activity, inhibit the urge to eat
sugary snacks, and periodically weigh himself to check whether
progress is being made. It is generally agreed that all of these pro-
cesses are important for successful goal achievement (e.g., Carver
and Scheier, 1990, 1998; Higgins, 1996). However, while the neu-
ral bases of attention, motor control, and response inhibition
have received considerable research attention (for a review, see
Berkman and Lieberman, 2009), less research has focused on the
neural basis of progress monitoring (Liberman and Dar, 2009),
despite indications that monitoring may be essential for processes
such as inhibitory control (Chatham et al., 2012). Furthermore,
research that does purport to investigate progress monitoring has
tended to focus on the neural systems involved in the detection of
errors, or situations where errors are likely to occur.
Progress monitoring, however, involves more than simply the
detection of errors, and reviews (e.g., Carver and Scheier, 1990;
Webb et al., 2013) point to the importance of four processes: (i)
periodically attending to relevant information (e.g., the caloric
value of food items, or weight as indicated by a set of scales),
(ii) updating the current state in working memory (WM) (e.g.,
replacing previous weight with current weight); (iii) compar-
ing the information to a target or reference value (e.g., current
weight compared to desired weight); and (iv) detecting a dis-
crepancy (e.g., that current weight is higher than expected). The
processes of comparing information on the current state with a
target or reference value and detecting a discrepancy have been
often studied using three main tasks: the Stroop task (e.g., Pardo
et al., 1990), the flanker task (e.g., Ullsperger and von Cramon,
2001), and the Simon task (e.g., Kerns, 2006). However, com-
paring information to a reference value does not always result
in the identification of a discrepancy (e.g., if progress is going as
expected), and thus should be considered as a separate process
from the detection of errors. Furthermore, some researchers (e.g.,
Berkman and Lieberman, 2009) include the selection of actions
designed to reduce discrepancy (e.g., changing one’s diet) as part
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of the process of progress monitoring. However, while action
selection may be essential for successful goal-directed behavior,
it is not part of the monitoring process, as monitoring may not
always result in action, or indicate that action is required. There
is, therefore, a need to rethink the way that the neural basis of
progress monitoring has been examined to date.
CURRENT EVIDENCE ON THE NEURAL BASIS OF PROGRESS
MONITORING
A range of evidence points to the likely neural basis of processes
involved in progress monitoring (for a review, see Berkman and
Lieberman, 2009). In the following, we focus on the roles of atten-
tion, WM, and the detection and assessment of discrepancies
between current and desired states.
Attention
Attention is likely to be the first process that is engaged when
monitoring goal progress. Attention is defined as the process
that selects which sensory information is processed (and possibly
reaches awareness) at any one time. As such, attention is consid-
ered to be a multi-channel process that can be driven by either
bottom–up (e.g., when attention is diverted to a salient stimulus)
or top–down (e.g., goal directed) processes. While stimulus-
driven attention is mostly supported by the ventral network (that
consists of the lateral and inferior frontal/prefrontal cortex (PFC)
and the temporo-parietal junction, Corbetta and Shulman, 2002],
the dorsal network [that includes the frontal eye field; Brodmann
Area (BA)8] and the superior parietal cortex have been shown
to be involved in goal-directed attention (Corbetta and Shulman,
2002; Fox et al., 2005).
How bottom–up and top–down systems interact to control
attention has been the focus of considerable research in recent
years (e.g., Buschman and Miller, 2007; Asplund et al., 2010).
For example, Spreng et al. (2013), examined connectivity within
and between the neural networks supporting top–down and
bottom–up attention. They suggest that, while each of the two
networks are mostly connected within themselves, a third fronto-
parietal network (Vincent et al., 2008; Niendam et al., 2012)
flexibly engages with either of the networks (Spreng et al., 2010;
Spreng and Schacter, 2012). This fronto-parietal “control” net-
work includes the lateral prefrontal cortex, precuneus, inferior
parietal lobule, medial superior prefrontal cortex, and the insula
(Vincent et al., 2008; Spreng et al., 2010; Niendam et al., 2012).
It has been suggested that this fronto-parietal network plays an
important role in goal-directed behavior, as it flexibly directs the
focus of attention from one network to another, and hence pro-
vides “executive control” of directed attention. It therefore seems
likely that this network is involved in monitoring progress toward
a current goal.
Finally, there is some evidence that top–down directed atten-
tion can modulate activity in early sensory cortices, resulting in
regions such as the primary visual cortex, that are often associated
with processing of existing visual stimuli, being activated in antic-
ipation of a specific visual stimulus (Chawla et al., 1999; Kastner
et al., 1999; Hopfinger et al., 2000). In relation to monitoring goal
progress, therefore, this finding suggests that goal-related infor-
mation, particularly if anticipated, is more likely to be attended
to. This idea is consistent with research which suggests that peo-
ple are “perceptually ready” to encounter stimuli that are relevant
for attaining their goal (Aarts et al., 2001).
Working memory
Attending to information is the first step involved in progress
monitoring. However, this information then needs to be stored
and updated as new information becomes available. Storage and
updating is considered to involve WM (Baddeley, 2010). Similar
to attentional processes, research has suggested that WM is sup-
ported by a network of brain regions that extends from the PFC
to the parietal cortex (Gazzaley et al., 2004; Sauseng et al., 2005).
For example, it was recently shown that patients with schizophre-
nia, who show WM deficits, also exhibit reduced connectivity in
the fronto-parietal network. This extensive fronto-parietal net-
work has distinguishable roles: while the posterior parietal region
is involved in manipulating information, the dorso-lateral PFC
(DLPFC) is associated with keeping track of the information that
is being manipulated (Champod and Petrides, 2007, 2010). Given
that monitoring goal progress may involve manipulating infor-
mation (e.g., to allow comparison with relevant reference values,
Ashford and Cummings, 1983; or to emphasize certain aspects,
Huang et al., 2012) both the posterior parietal region and the
DLPFC are likely to be involved.
Behaviorally and from a neuroscience perspective, there seem
to be close relationships, and possibly an overlap, between pro-
cesses involved in tasks that engage WM and those that involve
selective attention (Gazzaley and Nobre, 2012). Behaviorally,
selective attention has been shown to enhance WM performance
(Murray et al., 2011; Backer and Alain, 2012). From a neuro-
science perspective, repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation
directed at the inferior frontal junction, which has previously
shown to be involved in modulating visual attention (Zanto et al.,
2010), reduces the accuracy of WM (Zanto et al., 2011). These
findings suggest that processes involved in WM and attention
may be difficult to distinguish from one another. In the context
of progress monitoring, it means that attending to information,
committing it to memory, and updating the information as new
information becomes available, are likely to be difficult to empir-
ically distinguish. While research to date has attempted to under-
stand these processes in isolation, there may be added value in
observing how these processes interact in a relatively naturalistic
task such as monitoring progress over a period of time.
Detection and assessment of discrepancies
Once the current state has been identified and committed to
memory, the person seeking to evaluate their goal progress must
compare that information to their reference value or goal and
identify any discrepancies. Most research to date has investi-
gated the neural basis of discrepancy detection (i.e., recogniz-
ing that the current state does not match the reference value)
using paradigms involving error detection (i.e., identifying con-
flict between the current and desired response). For example,
the first study using functional magnetic resonance imagining
(fMRI) to examine error monitoring (Carter et al., 1998) used
a Continuous Performance Test, in which participants were pre-
sented with probes (either A or B) preceded by cues (either X
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or Y). The target response was only to be performed when the
letter A was followed by the letter X. The results suggested that
the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) was active when participants
made an error. However, Carter and colleagues also observed acti-
vation in the ACC when participants responded correctly if there
was increased response competition (i.e., BX and AY, which has
one letter correct, compared with AX or BY where both letters
are either correct or incorrect). Carter and colleagues concluded
that the ACC is involved in detecting conditions under which
errors are likely to occur (i.e., detecting potential conflict) rather
than being activated in response to the errors themselves, and
hence is used to detect situations in which action (or inhibition)
is required (for a review, see Botvinick et al., 2001).
Since Carter et al.’s study, similar paradigms have been studied
using a range of neuroimaging techniques, including intracra-
nial recordings (Gehring et al., 1993; Brázdil et al., 2002, 2005;
Wang et al., 2005; Pourtois et al., 2010), magnetoencaphalography
(MEG) (Miltner et al., 2003; Keil et al., 2010), and fMRI (Holroyd
et al., 2004; Debener et al., 2005). More recently, it has been sug-
gested that the ACC’s structural and functional organization can
be subdivided (Vogt, 2009). One of its sub-structures—the dorsal
ACC (dACC)—has been reported to be involved in the detection
of conflict between, for example, intended and actual responses
(Berkman et al., 2012, for a review, see Carter and Van Veen,
2007). Given that the detection of errors and situations in which
erroneous responses are likely is one aspect of monitoring goal
progress over time, it is reasonable to expect that the dACC will
be involved in monitoring goal progress.
UNANSWERED CONCEPTUAL AND METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES
Despite a range of evidence on the likely neural regions involved
in monitoring goal progress, several conceptual and methodolog-
ical issues remain unanswered. Monitoring goal progress is a
complex process that simultaneously involves elements or com-
binations of the processes described above. That is to say, while
these sub-processes are temporally organized, they are not eas-
ily distinguishable (e.g., WM and attention overlap, as discussed
above), and processes are not necessarily evoked in a linear tem-
poral fashion. For example, Control Theory (Carver and Scheier,
1982, 1990) suggests that attending to information on goal
progress identifies the current state (e.g., current weight), which is
then compared to the desired state, and any discrepancy is identi-
fied and used to inform subsequent goal-directed effort. Progress
monitoring (and its associated sub-processes) are therefore part
of a continuous feedback loop, rather than a linear temporal
sequence. However, despite the dynamic and continuous nature
of progress monitoring, most studies to date examine the sub-
processes of progress monitoring in isolation, often employing an
event-related design. Studying the sub-processes of goal-directed
behavior in isolation may limit our understanding of how these
processes are integrated and operate in real-life.
In an effort to overcome this problem, Berkman et al. (2012)
used a mixed design. However, their study still employed a task
that only required participants to monitor their performance on
each trial separately. As a result, it is difficult to know whether
the same neural regions, such as those involved in WM or sus-
tained and directed attention, would be involved if participants
were required to monitor their progress over a series of trials.
Furthermore, the variant of the go-no go task used by Berkman
et al. (2012) still involved contrasting erroneous with correct
responses, raising the possibility that some elements of progress
monitoring, such as those involved in comparing the current state
to the desired outcome (a process that would be invoked even if
the response were correct), were not examined.
There are a number of other limitations to studying the neural
basis of progress monitoring using tasks that only involve trial-by-
trial monitoring. Typically, monitoring goal progress requires that
the person periodically attend to relevant information (Berger,
2002). This may take place over a period of minutes (e.g., achiev-
ing a target in a game) or days (e.g., assessing progress toward
the goal of losing weight before the summer). Berkman and
Lieberman (2009) point to the need to develop tasks that reflect,
within the constraints of neuroimaging studies, monitoring over
the medium term, stating that: “Neuroscientists have yet to exam-
ine long-term goals. Although methodological constraints limit
our ability to examine the representation of long-term goals in a
magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scanner (e.g., imaging partic-
ipants while they engage in the task of being a ‘good American’),
an initial step would be to extend our existing knowledge of short-
term goals to slightly broader ones, termed here ‘medium-term’
goals.” (p. 104). Therefore, there is a need to study progress mon-
itoring using a block-rather than an event-related design, in order
to examine how the sub-processes of progress monitoring, that
have until now been explored individually, are integrated when
people assess their progress on tasks that span over time and
multiple events.
Finally, as noted earlier, previous studies have focused on
conflict monitoring, and have tended to employ paradigms
involving error detection. However, monitoring goal progress
is fundamentally different to monitoring for errors, as progress
monitoring is an ongoing process where relevant information
has to be updated, or aggregated, in order to assess the current
state in relation to the goal. In contrast, error monitoring
involves identifying discrete errors. Furthermore, while conflict
monitoring focuses on detecting errors, or detecting situations
where errors may occur, progress monitoring involves both
the detection of erroneous and correct responses (i.e., in both
instances people ask themselves “did I get that one right?”).
Therefore, focusing on the brain regions activated by erroneous,
compared with correct, responses is likely to mask the areas that
are involved in progress monitoring.
THE PRESENT RESEARCH
The present research investigated the neural basis of monitor-
ing progress over a medium term (rather than on a trial-by-trial
basis) in a context that does not rely on comparing the neural
substrates of erroneous responses to correct ones. Two computer
games were designed whose conditions differed in the nature of
the progress monitoring that was required. One computer game
involved processing numerical stimuli, since progress monitor-
ing often involves numerical processing (e.g., checking finances,
counting calories, etc.) and evidence suggests that people find
it easier to monitor quantifiable outcomes (Josephs et al., 1994;
Chang et al., 2013). The other game involved monitoring progress
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toward the goal of recreating a pattern of shapes; a task that relied
on visuo-spatial processing. Both tasks were designed not to give
participants direct feedback on the to-be-monitored aspect of the
task, but rather to examine self-initiated progress monitoring by
asking participants to keep track of the relevant dimension. Each
of the tasks were designed to minimize individual variations in the
process of monitoring (e.g., by providing specific instructions),
allowing the contrasts between conditions to reveal the neural
substrates that are involved in the various processes involved in
monitoring goal progress.
Given the role of the parietal cortex in selective attention and
WM (Gazzaley and Nobre, 2012) and in processing visuo-spatial
(Culham and Kanwisher, 2001) and numerical stimuli (Dehaene
et al., 2003), we hypothesized that monitoring progress in the
present study would activate a core network in the parietal cor-
tex that is common to both numerical and visuo-spatial tasks
(Benn et al., 2012). Specifically, we anticipated that monitor-
ing progress over time (as compared to trial-by-trial monitoring,
and the baseline conditions) would involve bilateral parietal acti-
vation. Furthermore, we expected to observe activation of the
fronto-parietal network, due to the task demanding attention and
WM resources (Gazzaley and Nobre, 2012). Specifically, we antic-
ipated activation in the DLPFC due to its role in updating WM
(Petrides, 2000; Provost et al., 2010), which is an important part
of monitoring progress over time (e.g., to carry over the current
value from one trial to the next). Lastly, we hypothesized that we
would observe activation in the dACC when participants were
monitoring their progress toward a specific reference value, and
hence when there is the greatest potential for a discrepancy to
occur between desired and actual responses. However, activation
of other areas within the cingulate gyrus was also hypothesized,
due to its reported role in many tasks requiring attention and
executive control (Fan et al., 2005).
METHODS
ETHICAL STATEMENT
Ethical approval for the study was granted by the Ethics Sub-
Committee in the Department of Psychology at The University
of Sheffield. The research was conducted in a manner consistent
with the American Psychological Association’s ethical principles.
PARTICIPANTS
Twenty healthy, native English speaking, right-handed (as
assessed by the revised Edinburgh handedness questionnaire,
Oldfield, 1971; Cohen, 2008) undergraduate students (Mean
age = 18.90 years, SD = 0.31) received £40 for participating in
the study. Half of the participants were female and all had normal
or corrected-to-normal vision, and were screened for MRI com-
patibility. Prior to the study, participants were informed that the
study investigated the neural correlates of computer game play-
ing. At the end of the study, participants were debriefed about the
real purpose of the study, and were given the chance to ask any
questions.
STIMULI AND DESIGN
The tasks were developed using Pygame 1.9.1. Participants played
two different games: a numerical game termed the “harbormaster
game” and a visuo-spatial game termed the “nursery game.” In
the harbormaster game, participants were asked to play the role
of a harbormaster at a busy port. As such, participants were pre-
sented with three boats arriving at the port on each trial, and
asked to decide which of the three boats should enter the port
(by selecting a boat using an MR-compatible mouse; NAtA tech-
nologies, FOM-2B-10B fMRI Mouse). There were three different
types of boats indicated by different values; boats marked with
a zero represented tourist boats (no fish bought or sold), boats
with a positive number represented fishing boats (bringing fish
into the port, with the amount of fish indicated by the number
on the boat), and boats with a negative number represented mer-
chant boats (wishing to buy the amount of fish indicated by the
number on the boat; Figure 1A).
There were four conditions in the harbormaster game: In the
no monitoring condition (Condition 1), participants were told that
it was a national holiday and, as such, only tourist boats should
be allowed to enter the port. Condition 1 was used as a control
condition to subtract the elements of calculation, visual process-
ing, and motor responses from the subsequent conditions. In
the trial-by-trial monitoring condition (Condition 2), participants
were also instructed to only allow tourist boats to enter the port.
However, in addition, they were also told that an inspector may
visit the port and that they would need to calculate the sum of
fish arriving at the port on each trial, ready to report to the inspec-
tor. As such, participants were required to select the tourist boat,
and to calculate the sum of the other two boats separately on
each trial (without having to carry it over from one trial to the
next). Condition 2, therefore, required trial-by-trial monitoring,
and enabled us to differentiate this process from monitoring over
time.
In the condition involving monitoring information over time
without a reference value (Condition 3), participants were told
that it was a trading day and, as such, they were instructed
to only allow merchant or fishing boats to enter the port and
to keep track of the cumulative total of fish held at the port
over the trials. Participants in this condition were not given a
clear target, but were rather told to “maximize trading.” Hence,
Condition 3 allowed us to examine the processes involved in
monitoring progress over time, but without comparing the cur-
rent state to a specific reference value. Finally, in the condition
involving monitoring over time with respect to a reference value
(Condition 4), participants were told that they could allow any
boat to enter the port in each trial, but that they should ensure
that cumulative fish stocks at the port did not go below zero
or above a randomly set number between four and 10 (depend-
ing on the storage capacity at the port that day), set at the start
of the condition. Condition 4, therefore, enabled us to exam-
ine the neural basis of monitoring over time with respect to a
reference value.
In each of the conditions, after every 4–6 trials, participants
were asked a question to test whether they had followed the
instructions. In Conditions 3 and 4, participants were asked about
the current fish stocks at the port. In Condition 2, they were asked
to report the sum of the two non-zero boats that had arrived
at the port on the last trial. In Condition 1, participants were
given a simple calculation question, similar to the one required
in Condition 2, but unrelated to the task (e.g., the sum of −2 and
0, as illustrated in Figure 1B). In all conditions, participants used
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org September 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 688 | 4
Benn et al. Monitoring goal progress
FIGURE 1 | The harbormaster game. Illustration of the type of boats (A) and experimental procedure (B).
the mouse to indicate whether their answer was larger or smaller
than a number shown on the screen.
In the nursery game, participants were asked to imagine them-
selves as an infant in a nursery being presented with three trucks
to play with. On each trial, they were asked to select which of the
three trucks appearing on the screen they wished to play with.
There were always two trucks marked with a randomly selected
shape representing toy blocks, and one truck that was not marked
with a shape—the “empty truck” (Figure 2B).
The nursery game had two conditions. In the no monitor-
ing condition (Condition 1), participants were told that they
preferred to watch TV rather than play with the trucks and so
were instructed to always select the empty truck. This condition
was used as a control task for subtracting visual processing and
mouse clicking from the monitoring condition. In the monitoring
condition (Condition 2), participants were told that they wanted
to play with the trucks and that their goal was to collect the
blocks (by selecting the relevant truck holding that shape using
the mouse) that were required to match a pattern of three shapes
that was presented at the start of the condition (the shapes were
drawn from the set presented in Figure 2A). While no constraints
were placed on the order with which participants collected the
shapes in Condition 2, participants were given a reference pat-
tern to work toward. The task, therefore, required participants to
monitor their progress over time by keeping track of which shapes
they had collected and which they still needed to collect.
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FIGURE 2 | The nursery game. The set of shapes used on the trucks in the nursery game (A), and experimental procedure (B).
In both games the vehicles were animated to move toward
the participant for 1.5 s before the participant was able to make
a selection. Two aspects of participants’ performance were mea-
sured during the tasks. First, we recorded which vehicle par-
ticipants selected on each trial. This information was used to
verify that participants followed the instructions. Responses were
scored by assigning one point every time a participant selected an
appropriate vehicle (e.g., selected a tourist boat in the no mon-
itoring condition of the harbormaster game), and zero points if
they selected the wrong vehicle (e.g., selected a tourist boat on a
trading day). Second, we recorded participants’ responses to the
questions designed to check that participants were monitoring
progress as required in the harbormaster game.
PROCEDURE
Participants were given instructions for each game and an oppor-
tunity to practice all conditions on a computer before entering
the scanner. Once lying in the scanner, participants practiced
the games a second time to familiarize themselves with the MRI
compatible mouse. Stimuli were viewed on a LCD screen via a
head-coil-mounted, rear-facing mirror.
SCAN DESIGN
The experiment used a block design, with three runs (Figure 3).
Each run began with a 30-s fixation block. Thereafter, participants
performed each condition for 30 s preceded by instructions for
12 s. The conditions of each game were grouped (i.e., participants
played four conditions of the harbormaster game before playing
FIGURE 3 | Example of the scan design (F, fixation block; I, instruction
block; T, trial block).
two conditions of the nursery game). The order of the games, as
well as the order of the conditions within each game, was coun-
terbalanced between and within participants. Once participants
had completed the first set of two games, a 30 s fixation period
provided a short break before starting the next set of two games.
Following the functional scans, a high-resolution, whole-brain
3D structural scan was acquired. In total, participants played each
game six times and were in the scanner for approximately 50 min.
DATA ACQUISITION
All MR images were acquired at 3T (Ingenia 3.0T, Philips
Healthcare, Best Holland) using a fifteen-channel radiofre-
quency receive-only head coil. Cerebral vascular response to the
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tasks was recorded using the blood oxygenation level-dependent
(BOLD) T2∗-weighted signal time-course. During each func-
tional scan, a time series of 194 dynamic datasets was obtained
using a 2-dimensional single-shot, echo-planar imaging (EPI)
sequence. The EPI scan parameters were as follows: repetition
time (TR) = 3000 ms; echo time (TE) = 35 ms; sensitivity-
encoding factor = 1.8; flip angle = 90◦; in-plane voxel size
= 2.4 × 2.4 mm interpolated to 1.8 × 1.8 mm; 35 contiguous
2-dimensional transaxial slices each having slice thickness =
4 mm. Anatomical reference data were obtained for each sub-
ject using a Magnetization Prepared-Rapid Acquisition Gradient
Echo (MP-RAGE) technique (TE = 3.8 ms; TR = 8.3 ms; TI =
963 ms; flip angle = 8◦). This 3D-encoded acquisition yielded
T1-weighted data covering the entire intra-cranial structures at
a voxel resolution of 1 × 1 × 1 mm.
DATA PROCESSING
Data analysis was performed using SPM8 (Wellcome Department
of Imaging Neuroscience, London; www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/)
implemented in MatLab (The MathWorks Inc., Natick, MA).
Functional images were corrected for spatial variation between
dynamics. Realigned images were then spatially normalized
to the standard SPM EPI template. Following normalization,
images were smoothed using an 8 mm full-width half-maximum
(FWHM) Gaussian filter. After specifying the block-design matrix
for each participant, the BOLD signals obtained under different
conditions were assessed using a general linear model. Statistical
contrasts were constructed for each individual, and then used for
the second level group analysis. All contrasts presented here were




The mean accuracy with which participants selected the targets
(Figure 4) suggests that participants followed the instructions,
and were reasonably competent in doing so (minimum of 80%
accuracy)1 . Given that chance level on each trial is 33%, and
the average number of trials per block was 7, this level of accu-
racy is likely to be achieved by chance in just 0.08% of cases.
1On participant was identified whose performance was significantly worse
than the average for the group in two out of the six conditions (>2.5 stan-
dard deviations from the mean). To see whether inclusion of this participant
influenced our findings, we reran the behavioral and fMRI analysis exclud-
ing this participant. The results were largely unchanged and so the analyses
reported include all participants.
FIGURE 4 | Mean accuracy and reaction time to the question designed to check that participants were monitoring as intended in the harbormaster
game (A) and mean accuracy and reaction time of responses (i.e., target selection) across both games (B).
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In terms of the time taken to respond to the questions designed
to assess monitoring, a One-Way ANOVA revealed a significant
difference between the conditions of the harbormaster game,
F(3, 75) = 11.52, p < 0.001. Participants took longer to answer
the simple addition questions in Condition 1, which involved no
monitoring, compared to the questions about monitoring asked
in Condition 2 (Mean difference = −370.49 ms, p < 0.001),
Condition 3 (Mean difference = −376.84 ms, p < 0.001), and
Condition 4 (Mean difference = −284.53 ms, p = 0.003). This
further suggests that participants followed the task instructions
because in Condition 1 participants needed to perform the rele-
vant calculation in response to the question as it was presented,
whereas participants in the monitoring conditions were monitor-
ing and updating the relevant information as they went along and
so did not need to make any new calculations in response to the
question.
IMAGING RESULTS
Given that all conditions had a high rate of correct responses,
as reflected by the behavioral data, we did not exclude indi-
vidual responses from the fMRI analysis as they are unlikely
to significantly influence the group data. Furthermore, since
a similar level of errors was observed in all conditions, it is
likely that activations related to errors would not be statisti-
cally significant following subtraction of one condition from
another.
The harbormaster game
There were four conditions in the harbormaster game: no mon-
itoring (Condition 1), trial-by-trial monitoring (Condition 2),
monitoring over-time without a reference value (Condition 3),
and monitoring progress over-time with respect to a reference
value (Condition 4). To examine the neural processes involved
in the different types of monitoring, we computed three con-
trasts: Condition 2 > 1, Condition 3 > 1, and Condition 4 > 1.
Contrast 2 > 1 involved right superior parietal, left inferior pari-
etal and bilateral cingulate and superior and medial frontal gyri.
Contrast 3 > 1 resulted in activation in the right middle and
medial frontal gyri, cingulate gyrus and left inferior and supe-
rior parietal regions. Contrast 4 > 1 resulted in activation of the
bilateral precuneus, inferior and superior parietal lobules, infe-
rior, medial and middle frontal gyri and cingulate gyrus (Table 1).
The dACC was only significantly activated in the contrast between
Conditions 4 > 1.
To identify the differences between monitoring over time
and trial-by-trial monitoring, we computed the contrast between
Conditions 3 > 2, where WM and calculation demands are sim-
ilar. The results revealed large areas of activation in the right
superior and middle frontal gyri (BA8/9/10) (Table 2).
To further examine the neural basis of monitoring progress
over time with a clear reference value, we computed the con-
trasts from BOLD imaging data between Conditions 4 > 2 and
Conditions 4 > 3 (Table 3). The contrast between Conditions
4 > 2 revealed activations of the right middle frontal gyrus (BA9)
and inferior parietal lobule (BA39, BA40). The contrast between
Condition 4 > 3 differed only on one dimension—whether mon-
itoring occurred with or without a reference value or goal—and
revealed only one area of activation in the left cuneus (BA17)
(Table 3).
The nursery game
The nursery game was designed to examine the brain regions
involved in monitoring progress toward a visuo-spatial target.
To do so, we computed the contrast between Conditions 2 > 1
(Table 4). This contrast is conceptually similar to the contrast
between Conditions 4 > 1 in the harbormaster game as both com-
pare monitoring progress over time with a reference value to no
monitoring. Much like the contrast between Conditions 4 > 1,
this contrast resulted in an extensive fronto-parietal network of
activation. However, while in the contrast for the nursery game
this network was bilateral, the contrast between Conditions 4 > 1
of the harbormaster game predominantly involved the left pari-
etal and right frontal regions. In addition, the contrast between
Conditions 2 > 1 of the nursery game included the dACC and
bilateral cuneus (BA17).
Conjunction (inclusive) analysis of the harbormaster and nursery
games
To identify the neural basis of progress monitoring in a way
that is relatively independent of the modality of the target rep-
resentations (verbal or visual), we computed the combined con-
trast between Conditions 4 > 1 of the harbormaster game and
Conditions 2 > 1 of the nursery game. The results are presented in
Table 5 and Figure 5. As expected from the activations observed
in the two games individually, an extended fronto-parietal net-
work was activated when monitoring progress over time with
respect to a reference value. Activations were also observed in the
bilateral primary visual cortex (BA 17/18) and the dACC.
DISCUSSION
The present research examined the neural regions involved in
monitoring goal progress, across numerical and visuo-spatial
modalities. Two computer games were designed whose condi-
tions differed in the nature of the progress monitoring that was
required. In the harbormaster game, Condition 1 acted as a base-
line condition, Condition 2 involved trial-by-trial monitoring,
Condition 3 involved monitoring information over time with-
out comparing progress to a reference value, and Condition 4
involved monitoring progress over time with respect to a numer-
ical reference value. In the nursery game, Condition 1 acted
as a baseline condition, while Condition 2 involved monitor-
ing progress over time with respect to a reference value of a
visual nature. The findings from both games were used to iden-
tify a modality-independent network of activations involved in
monitoring progress over time.
The findings point to a series of activations in the fronto-
parietal network, including the right DLPFC (BA9) and bilateral
inferior and superior parietal regions. This network is largely
similar to activations identified in studies of the neural basis of
attention and WM (Corbetta and Shulman, 2002; Fox et al., 2005;
Gazzaley and Nobre, 2012) supporting the idea that these pro-
cesses are involved in monitoring goal progress. In addition, the
dACC was activated when progress was measured against a refer-
ence value confirming previous findings, which indicate that the
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Table 1 | Brain regions activated in the different conditions of the harbormaster game (FWE Corrected, p = 0.05).
Region BA Max coordinate Z score Cluster size Beta value
Lobe Anatomical localization of cluster X Y Z
CONDITION 2 > CONDITION 1
Right
Parietal Superior parietal lobule – 30 −64 46 4.87 1 1.03
Inter-hemispheric
Frontal Superior (L,C,R)/medial (L,R) frontal gyrus 6(L,R),8(L) 0 12 56 5.35 19 1.38
Frontal(L)/limbic(L,R) Cingulate gyrus 32 −8 18 42 5.36 27 1.16
Left
Parietal Inferior parietal lobule 40 −34 −54 48 5.25 12 1.29
Inferior parietal lobule 40 −44 −40 46 5.32 25 1.54
Frontal Inferior frontal gyrus – −48 10 20 5.0 1 1.47
CONDITION 3 > CONDITION 1
Right
Frontal Middle frontal gyrus 8 32 22 52 5.28 21 2.0
Frontal/limbic Cingulate/medial frontal gyrus 32 4 24 42 6.52 213 1.91
Parietal Inferior parietal lobule 40 50 −36 48 5.39 76 1.51
Left
Parietal Inferior parietal lobule 40 −6 −74 50 5.39 76 1.65
Precuneus/superior parietal lobule 7 50 −36 48 5.92 105 1.51
CONDITION 4 > CONDITION 1
Right
Parietal Inferior parietal lobule, sub gyral – 34 −60 40 4.97 3 1.2
Inferior parietal lobule, post-central gyrus 40 50 −38 48 5.53 97 1.35
Inferior parietal lobule 7 36 −62 44 4.97 2 1.33
inferior parietal lobule 40 48 −60 46 4.98 3 1.09
Inferior/superior parietal lobule 7 36 −68 48 5.13 16 1.44
Precuneus, superior parietal lobule 7 8 −68 48 5.64 77 1.68
Frontal Insula/inferior frontal gyrus/extra nuclear 47 34 18 −6 5.57 19 0.99
Middle frontal gyrus – −44 46 −4 5.26 9 1.5
Frontal/limbic Inferior/medial/middle/superior/cingulate frontal gyrus 6,8,9,46 38 34 32 6.37 758 1.6
Limbic Anterior cingulate – 10 32 26 5.01 1 1.03
Left
Cerebellum Posterior lobe-Uvula – −32 −64 −34 5.0 4 1.25
Parietal Precuneus, inferior/superior parietal lobule 7,19,40 −44 −40 44 6.45 396 1.59
Precuneus 7 −8 −72 48 5.63 29 1.27
Frontal Inferior/middle frontal gyrus 10,46 −42 38 18 5.17 37 1.8
Middle/-18superior frontal gyrus 6 −18 14 58 4.98 7 1.12
Frontal/limbic Cingulate/medial frontal gyrus 8,32 −2 20 48 5.36 22 1.76
dACC is activated in response to situations where a discrepancy
between the current and target state is likely (Carter et al., 1998;
Ullsperger and von Cramon, 2001; Kerns et al., 2004; Abutalebi
et al., 2012; Berkman et al., 2012). Finally, despite identical visual
stimuli being presented in the monitoring and no monitoring
conditions, monitoring with respect to a reference value resulted
in activation of early visual processing regions (BA17). We suggest
that this activation provides evidence of top–down processing
of goal-directed attention to information in the primary visual
cortex (Chawla et al., 1999; Hopfinger et al., 2000).
To our knowledge, the present research is the first to exam-
ine the neural basis of monitoring progress over a medium term,
rather than on a trial-by-trial basis. As predicted, all conditions
(in comparison to baseline) increased activation in the fronto-
parietal network. This included activation of the inferior frontal
gyrus, previously shown to be involved in stimulus-driven atten-
tion (Corbetta and Shulman, 2002) and the right superior parietal
cortex and superior and middle frontal gyri (BA9, BA10), includ-
ing the frontal eye field, which have previously been implicated in
goal-directed attention (Corbetta and Shulman, 2002; Fox et al.,
2005). A similar network has been shown to be involved in WM
(Gazzaley and Nobre, 2012). This pattern of activation, suggests
that attention and WM resources may be needed for the effective
monitoring of goal progress.
We hypothesized that the DLPFC would be activated when
monitoring goal progress over time, due to its involvement in
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Table 2 | Brain regions identified for monitoring over time (Condition 3) relative to trial-by-trial monitoring (Condition 2) in the harbormaster
game (FWE Corrected, p = 0.05).
Region BA Max coordinate Z score Cluster size Beta value
Lobe Anatomical localization of cluster X Y Z
HARBORMASTER 3 > HARBORMASTER 2
Right
Sub-lobar Insula/extra nuclear 13 32 14 −6 5.14 2 0.77
Extra nuclear 13 30 16 −8 4.86 1 0.65
– 20 14 10 4.91 1 0.45
– 8 −4 0 5.28 5 0.5
Frontal Middle frontal gyrus 10 40 50 8 5.04 15 1.54
Superior frontal gyrus 10 30 56 20 4.91 3 1.59
Superior/middle frontal gyri 8/9/10 22 32 42 5.97 386 1.17
Limbic/parietal Cingulate gyrus/precuneus 7 6 −36 44 4.86 3 0.9
Left
Frontal Middle frontal gyrus 8 −24 24 50 4.97 1 0.83
Superior frontal gyrus 6 −20 12 60 4.88 1 0.84
Table 3 | Brain regions identified for monitoring over time with respect to a reference value (Condition 4) vs. monitoring over time without a
reference value (Condition 3) and trial-by-trial monitoring (Condition 2) in the harbormaster game (FWE Corrected, p = 0.05).
Region BA Max coordinate Z score Cluster size Beta value
Lobe Anatomical localization of cluster X Y Z
HARBORMASTER 4 > HARBORMASTER 2
Right
Parietal Inferior parietal lobule 40 52 −44 46 5.24 11 1.21
Angular gyrus/inferior parietal lobule 39,40 48 −64 38 5.04 10 1.21
Frontal Middle frontal gyrus 10,46 44 44 18 5.10 7 1.73
– 26 18 44 4.89 1 1.19
Middle/superior frontal gyrus 9 38 38 34 5.81 35 1.49
HARBORMASTER 4 > HARBORMASTER 3
Left
Occipital Cuneus 17 −16 −88 4 5.37 26 1.01
updating WM (Petrides, 2000; Provost et al., 2010). Consistent
with this idea, two of the contrasts in the harbormaster game
(contrasts 4 > 2 and 3 > 2) and the contrast in the nursery
game (contrast 2 > 1), revealed activations in the right DLPFC
(BA9). These findings are likely to reflect the fact that these
conditions required participants to keep track of their current
state and update this value on each trial (e.g., when fish were
bought or sold, or new shapes were added to the current col-
lection). We conclude, therefore, that the right DLPFC is likely
to play an important role in monitoring progress toward goals
over time, regardless of the nature of information that needs to be
considered.
Activations in the inferior and superior parietal cortices were
also observed in all conditions involving monitoring (e.g., trial-
by-trial and over time) compared with the baseline conditions. It
is likely that in some contrasts (namely, contrasts 2 > 1, 3 > 1 and
4 > 1 in the harbormaster game, contrast 2 > 1 in the nursery
game) activations of the right superior and left inferior parietal
reflect, at least in part, processes involved in calculation (Benn
et al., 2012) and the manipulation of visuo-spatial information
(Culham and Kanwisher, 2001). However, parietal activation may
also be directly related to the process of monitoring information
over time since parietal activation was also observed in contrasts
4 > 2 and 3 > 2 of the harbormaster game (where calculation
demands are similar) and in the nursery game contrast, where
parietal activation extended over a large bilateral region includ-
ing both inferior and superior parietal lobules. Several studies
using fMRI (e.g., Rao et al., 2001; for a review, see Lewis and
Miall, 2003) and EEG (Mohl and Pfurtscheller, 1991) show that
the right parietal cortex, particularly the right inferior parietal
region, plays a role in the perception of time. It has further been
suggested that the right parietal cortex is a hub for the processing
of magnitude, including numerical, spatial and temporal process-
ing (Walsh, 2003). It therefore seems likely that, regardless of the
modality of the stimuli being processed, a circuit involving the
frontal-parietal network is involved in monitoring goal progress
over time, as demonstrated by the joint contrast of the nursery
and harbormaster games.
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Table 4 | Brain regions identified for monitoring progress (Condition 2) vs. not monitoring progress (Condition 1) in the nursery game.
Region BA Max coordinate (MNI) Z score Cluster size Beta value
Lobe Anatomical localization of cluster X Y Z
RIGHT
Cerebellum Posterior lobe/Pyramis – 24 −64 −38 5.27 7 0.90
Occipital Cuneus 17/28/23/30 12 −74 10 5.4 76 1.38
18 6 −90 18 4.99 6 1.11
Parietal Inferior/superior parietal lobule/precuneus/sub gyral 7/19/39/40 32 −72 44 6.01 301 2.21
Frontal Inferior frontal gyrus 47 30 24 −6 5.14 43 2.48
Inferior frontal gyrus/sub-gyral – 46 10 18 4.95 6 2.31
Middle frontal gyrus 10 36 50 6 4.97 3 2.20
9/46 48 32 30 5.45 100 3.17
Medial frontal gyrus – 10 36 36 4.84 1 1.37
Thalamus Pulvinar – 20 −30 2 5.02 1 0.49
– 22 −28 4 4.85 1 0.48
Limbic Anterior cingulate/cingulate gyrus – 12 26 30 4.95 2 1.19
INTER-HEMISPHERIC
Parietal Precuneus (L,R)/sub-gyral (R)/superior parietal (L) 7 10 −76 46 5.82 200 1.64
Limbic Cingulate gyrus/medial frontal gyrus (L,R) 6,8,32 (L,R) 4 24 46 6.17 239 2.66
LEFT
Cerebellum Anterior lobe/Culmen – −38 −44 −26 4.84 1 1.19
Occipital Cuneus 17 −12 −78 4 5.28 33 1.29
18/19 −12 −90 22 5.18 19 0.84
Occipito-temporal Fusiform gyrus/sub-gyral 37 −46 −60 −14 5.09 14 2.0
Parietal Inferior/superior parietal lobule/sub gyral 7/19/40 −28 −68 42 6.08 317 2.71
Inferior parietal lobule – −46 −38 44 4.98 6 1.58
Frontal Insula/inferior frontal gyrus 13/47 −30 20 −6 5.19 21 2.0
Middle/inferior frontal gyrus/sub-gyral 46 −46 32 22 5.66 168 2.92
Inferior frontal gyrus/sub-gyral – −40 8 24 5.11 20 2.64
Middle frontal gyrus 6 −28 10 62 5.71 18 1.28
Thalamus Pulvinar – −10 −8 −2 4.96 1 0.52
Sub-lobar Extra nuclear/corpus callosum – −2 4 24 4.86 3 0.93
FWE Corrected, p = 0.05.
In contrast to the consistent activation observed in the fronto-
parietal network, the dACC, which has been previously associated
with discrepancy detection and reduction (Carter et al., 1998;
Ullsperger and von Cramon, 2001; Kerns et al., 2004; Abutalebi
et al., 2012; Berkman et al., 2012), was only activated in the
contrasts where the baseline condition was compared to a task
that involved monitoring with respect to a reference value. In
the present paradigm, the dACC was likely involved in iden-
tifying potential discrepancies between the current state (i.e.,
the amount of fish in the port or the current combination of
shapes that had been collected) and the reference value (i.e.,
the total amount of fish allowed at the port, or the target set
of shapes). These findings suggest that, while the dACC is an
important part of the process of monitoring progress, it is not
the only process involved, and monitoring progress over time
often involves attending to and updating information without
any discrepancy necessarily occurring (e.g., when progress is as
expected).
As noted earlier, monitoring with respect to a reference value
(contrast 4 > 3 of the harbormaster game and the contrast
between the conditions of the nursery game) led to activation
in early visual processing regions (BA17). This finding is con-
sistent with accumulating evidence that early sensory processing
is involved in goal-directed behavior. For example, evidence sug-
gests that top-down directed attention results in increased firing
of neurons in the visual cortex (V1 and V4) of rhesus monkeys
(McAdams and Maunsell, 1999), and that goal-directed atten-
tion can modulate activity in the early visual cortex of humans
(Chawla et al., 1999; Hopfinger et al., 2000). More recently, Levita
et al. (2014) demonstrated using EEG that the early visual cor-
tex is involved in processing learned danger signals (i.e., serving
the goal of avoiding harm). In the current research, while the
two tasks involving monitoring progress with respect to a ref-
erence value evoked activation in this region, this activation
was more pronounced in the nursery game, where the refer-
ence value and the expected stimuli were of visual nature (i.e.,
not nameable). Future research might, therefore, investigate how
the nature of the reference value as well as the nature of the to-
be-monitored information influences activations in early sensory
cortices.
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Table 5 | Brain regions activated during monitoring progress over time with respect to a reference value in both the harbormaster and the
nursery games (FWE corrected, p = 0.05).
Region BA Max coordinate Z score Cluster size Beta value
Lobe Anatomical localization of cluster X Y Z
RIGHT
Occipital Cuneus 17,18,23,30 14 −78 6 5.21 73 1.32
Parietal Inferior/superior parietal lobule,
precuneus, angular gyrus, sub-gyral
7,19,39,40 32 −70 44 6.22 256 2.62
Superior parietal lobule, precuneus 7 10 −78 48 5.82 178 2.92
Inferior parietal lobule, post-central gyrus 40 52 −44 50 5.83 44 1.86
Frontal Inferior frontal gyrus. Insula, sub-gyral 13,47 34 20 −6 5.32 74 2.85
Middle/superior fontal gyrus 10 28 60 −8 5.31 11 3.73
Middle frontal gyrus, sub-gyral 10 36 50 6 5.44 29 3.61
Inferior/middle/superior frontal gyrus 9,10,46 42 34 34 5.71 233 4.26
Middle/superior frontal gyrus 6,8 30 20 46 6.35 188 2.43
INTER-HEMISPHERIC
Limbic/frontal Anterior cingulate(R), cingulate/medial
frontal gyrus(L,R), superior frontal gyrus
(L,C,R)
6,8,32(L,R),9(R) 6 26 46 6.78 530 2.66
LEFT
Cerebellum Posterior lobe-cerebellar tonsil – −38 −58 −54 4.93 8 1.7
Occipital Cuneus 18 −10 −88 12 5.09 8 1.17
18,19 −8 −94 22 5.2 20 1.11
Parietal Inferior/superior parietal lobule,
precuneus, supramarginal/angular gyrus,
sub-gyral
7,19,39,40 −28 −68 42 6.49 588 2.72
Precuneus, superior parietal lobule 7 −6 −74 50 6.25 119 2.17
Frontal Inferior frontal gyrus/insula/extra nuclear 13,47 −28 20 0 5.25 29 1.73
Inferior frontal gyrus, sub-gyral – −36 38 6 5.5 29 1.08
−40 10 24 5.29 55 2.14
Middle frontal gyrus – −42 44 −6 5.52 13 2.62
6 −26 12 46 5.01 10 1.38
Inferior/middle frontal gyrus, sub-gyral 46 −46 34 22 5.82 238 3.4
Middle/superior/medial frontal gyrus 6,32 −24 14 60 5.52 76 1.63
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Monitoring strategies may differ between individuals. For exam-
ple, one participant may keep track of the shapes that they have
collected by trying to form an aggregated image, while another
participant may try to remember individual shapes. However,
in the present research we analyzed the findings at the group
level, assuming that all participants approached the task in a
similar way—which seemed reasonable given the relatively con-
strained nature of the focal tasks. Future research might, how-
ever, wish to examine the neural basis of different monitoring
strategies. This could be done in a quasi-experimental fashion
by asking participants what strategy (or strategies) they used,
or in an experimental fashion by directing participants to use
one strategy or another. Relatedly, the behavioral responses in
the present experiment (namely, whether participants selected
appropriate targets, or could report on the relevant dimension
that they were monitoring) were simply designed to ensure that
participants followed task instructions, rather than to elucidate
the nature or difficulty of monitoring progress. Future research
could, however, use behavioral measures to examine the nature of
progress monitoring—e.g., examining the effect of different mon-
itoring strategies on performance on a secondary task (e.g., one
involving WM). We would expect that more demanding forms
of monitoring, such as comparing a current value to a reference
value, would impact performance on a secondary task to a greater
extent than less demanding forms of monitoring.
In addition, given the role of the parietal cortex in both numer-
ical and visuo-spatial processing and the observed activation in
primary visual cortex, one limitation of the present research
is that it is difficult to identify the determinants of activations
in these regions. Future research could, however, address this
issue by using an auditory paradigm. For example, participants
could work toward recreating a musical rhythm by selecting sub-
patterns of this rhythm. An auditory paradigm could further help
to establish whether monitoring goal progress affects activation in
other primary sensory cortices, and to what degree parietal acti-
vation can be attributed to visuo-spatial, numerical or attentional
processing.
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FIGURE 5 | Illustration of the neural regions activated by the
conjunction (inclusive) between the harbormaster (4 > 1) and nursery
(2 > 1) games. (FWE corrected, p = 0.05, K = 0).
CONCLUSION
The present research investigated the neural correlates of mon-
itoring goal progress over a medium-term period. Our findings
largely support the view that the dACC plays a role in discrepancy
detection, which is an important aspect of progress monitor-
ing. However, the present research also helped to identify the
neural basis of monitoring progress over time, something that
has been relatively neglected in previous studies. We found that
regions of the parietal cortex, as well as the right DLPFC, are
involved in monitoring progress over time—something that is
likely due to monitoring placing demands on attention and WM
resources as well the requirement for checking and updating of
information over time. Lastly, we report evidence that progress
monitoring activated regions of the primary visual cortex, adding
to growing evidence that the primary sensory cortices may play an
important role in monitoring information in relation to specific
goals.
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